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Legal Narratology
RichardA Posnert
Law's Stories: Narrativeand Rhetoric in the Law. Peter Brooks
and Paul Gewirtz, eds. Yale University Press, 1996. Pp v, 290.
The law and literature movement has evolved to a point at
which it comprises a number of subdisciplines. One of the newer
ones--call it "legal narratology"-is concerned with the story
elements in law and legal scholarship. A major symposium on legal narratology was held at the Yale Law School in 1995, and
Law's Stories is a compilation of essays and comments given at
the symposium. The book is not definitive or even comprehensive. Not all bases are touched, and a number of leading practitioners of legal narratology did not participate. But it is about as
good a place as any to start if you want to understand and evaluate the new field. The papers in the volume span a wide range,
covering the narrative elements in legal scholarship, trials, sentencing hearings, confessions, and judicial opinions. The editors,
Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, a professor of comparative literature and a professor of law respectively, have each written a lucid and informative introduction. The book is well edited and
highly readable-and so well balanced that, as we shall see, it
makes the reader wonder just how bright the future of legal narratology is.
A story, or, better, a narrative (because "story" suggests a
short narrative), is a true or fictional account of a sequence of
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago. I thank Martha Nussbaum for helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this review.
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events unfolding in time, the events being invented, selected,
emphasized, or arranged in such a way as to explain, inform, or
edify. As Brooks reminds us in his introduction, paraphrasing
Aristotle, stories "must have beginnings, middles, and ends" and
must be "so constructed that the mind of the listener, viewer, or
reader [can] take in the relation of beginning, middle, and end"
and "see the end as entailed by a process" (p 17). The story need
not be true, but it must be coherent, intelligible, and significant.
Narrative is ubiquitous in history, in biography, in literature, in myth, and in most religions. It plays a smaller but still
important role in other fields as well, including the visual arts
and philosophy and even economics, where "story," contrasted
with a formal model, is the name used for the informal, intuitive
explanation, which is often indeed story-like, of an economic
phenomenon. Asked to explain why manufacturers engage in resale price maintenance, an economist might tell the following
"story": A manufacturer of microwave ovens wants his dealers to
provide presale services, such as a demonstration of how you can
cook with one. Each dealer would hesitate to incur the cost of
providing such services lest a competing dealer be able to underprice him by avoiding the cost. So the manufacturer fixes a floor
under the dealers' retail prices that is high enough to enable the
dealers to defray the costs of the services. Forced to compete for
customers without cutting prices, the dealers vie with one another to provide presale services that customers value. The
manufacturer is better off, which is why manufacturers engage
in resale price maintenance (or would if permitted by the antitrust laws). End of story.
Stories play a big role in the legal process. Plaintiff and defendant in a trial each tell a story, which is actually a translation
of their "real" story into the narrative and rhetorical forms
authorized by law, and the jury chooses the story that it likes
better. (If it is a criminal case and the defendant's confession is
placed in evidence, there is a story within the story. Criminal
confessions are the subject of Peter Brooks's essay (pp 114-34).)
This of course is not how the trial process is conceptualized by
the law. The law says that the plaintiff must prove each element
of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence (or must prove it
beyond a reasonable doubt, if it is a criminal case, but I can ignore that detail), and likewise the defendant if he pleads any affirmative defenses. Ronald Allen, unfortunately not a participant
in the symposium, has shown that if this, the official account of
the trial process, were taken literally, it would imply that plaintiffs would win many cases in which the likelihood that their
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claim was valid was actually very slight.' He argues convincingly
that what really happens in a trial is that each side tries to convince the jury that its story is more plausible than the opponent's
story. The storytelling, indeed mythmaking, potential of the
criminal trial is the subject of a brilliant essay by Robert Ferguson on the trial of John Brown.2 The essay is not in the book, but
Robert Weisberg's paper on trials as narratives, which is, summarizes Ferguson's essay compactly and skillfully (pp 79-83).
The Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence has
magnified the story element in the sentencing phase of capital
trials. The Court insists that the defendant be permitted to tell a
no-holds-barred story of his life that is designed to persuade the
jury that he does not deserve to be put to death. And now the
Court has decided that the victim's family may be allowed to tell
the jury the absent victim's story, to offset the impact of the defendant's story.4 One of the best papers in this volume is Paul
Gewirtz's in defense of the "victim impact statement" in capital
cases (pp 135-61).
Judicial opinions usually have a story element, the narration
of the facts of the case that opens most opinions. Some judges try
to cast the whole opinion as the story of the parties' dispute, using chronology rather than a logical or analytical structure to organize the opinion. Cardozo in the common law opinions that he
wrote as a state court judge, and Learned Hand in his copyright
opinions, were masters of vivid narration of the facts of the case.'
Stories play a smaller role in legal scholarship than they do
in the legal process itself, but their role is growing. "Oppositional
scholarship" by critical race theorists and by feminists relies
heavily on stories-historical, autobiographical, or even science
' See generally Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 BU L Rev
401 (1986); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of JuridicalProof,13 Cardozo L Rev 373 (1991).
Suppose that a plaintiff in a particular tort case must prove three things to prevail on his
claim for $100,000 in damages for personal injury (forget any affirmative defenses the de-

fendant might have): that the defendant was negligent, that the defendanqs negligence
caused injury to the plaintiff, and that the injury imposed a cost of at least $100,000 on
the plaintiff. Suppose each of the three propositions has a probability of.51 of being true.
Then the probability that all three are true (assuming they are independent of each
other) is only .13 (.51 * .51 * .51). Yet, on these assumptions, according to the official
story of the proof process, the plaintiff has proved his case! See also id at 374 n 4 (noting
that "[s]uch issues will generally not be independent, but that simply makes the mathematics slightly more complicated without affecting the analysis!).
2 See Robert A. Ferguson, Story and Transcriptionin the Trial of John Brown, 6 Yale
J L & Humanities 37 (1994).
3 Lockett v Ohio, 438 US 586
(1978).
" Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808 (1991).
' See, for example, Hynes v New York CentralRailroadCo, 231 NY 229, 131 NE 898
(1921) (Cardozo); Nichols v UniversalPicturesCorp, 45 F2d 119 (2d Cir 1930) (Hand).
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fiction-of oppression, designed to stir the reader to a more vivid
awareness of the predicaments of the oppressed.6 Gewirtz links
this literature to victim impact evidence in capital cases by
pointing out that such evidence "consists of stories of victimized
and silenced people, who are the usual concern of many in the
[legal] storytelling movement" (p 143). "Oppositionists" do not
like his point because they do not like capital punishment, and
allowing victim impact statements is calculated to increase the
number of cases in which it is imposed.
If story is thus an important element in law, what are the
best intellectual tools for examining and evaluating it? The natural places to look, it might seem, would be literary theory, which
has long concerned itself with narrative as a pervasive feature of
imaginative literature, and epistemology, which has long taken
an interest in the truth value of narrative, for example historical
narrative.8 Yet much of the best scholarship on the story element
in law owes little to these or any other fields outside of law itself.
Gewirtz's paper on victim impact statements does owe a debt to
recent philosophical writings by Martha Nussbaum, Robert
Solomon, Ronald de Sousa, and others, on the role of emotion in
practical reason. Gewirtz emphasizes that the emotionality of a
victim's (or a defendant's) narrative may quicken thought by riveting attention, shaking the listener or reader out of his dogmatic
slumber, making him more receptive to new ideas (pp 145-46).
But the debt is slight; Gewirtz's analysis is powered mainly by
his understanding of the criminal justice system, as well as by
the simple common sense point that if the defendant is to be allowed to plead for mercy, the absent victim should be allowed to
plead for justice (like the ghost of Hamlet's father, or the Commendatore in Don Giovanni). Ronald Allen's work on the story
element in the trial, while it may owe something to the theory of
probability and to reflections on that theory by philosophers, derives primarily from the author's engagement as a law professor
with the law of evidence. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry's
criticisms of the oppositional storytelling literature as having serious problems with accuracy, typicality, and analytical content
For an exhaustive survey, see Nancy L. Cook, Outside the Tradition:Literature as

Legal Scholarship,63 U Cin L Rev 95 (1994).
Two narratologists have weighed in against the admissibility of victim impact evidence-and have not concealed their opposition to capital punishment. Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 Phil & Pub Aff 83, 119, 121 n 93 (1993); Susan Bandes, Em-

pathy, Narrative,and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U Chi L Rev 361, 392 & n 156 (1996).
' The literary and philosophical approaches to narrative are illustrated by Gerard
Genette, Narrative Discourse:An Essay in Method (Cornell 1980), and Arthur C. Danto,
Narrationand Knowledge (Columbia 1985), respectively.
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do not derive from any arcane extradisciplinary source; they are
merely the application of logic and common sense to the work of
the storytellers.9
Although Law's Stories is only 237 pages long (ignoring the
index and the numerous notes, inconveniently tucked into the
back), it contains twenty-one papers-enough, one might think,
to provide the reader with a broad conspectus of the field. Many
of them, however, turn out to be very short comments; subtracted, they expose the incompleteness of the book's coverage.
Ronald Allen's work, as I mentioned, is not represented. The oppositional storytelling literature is represented only by feminists
(Martha Minow and Catharine MacKinnon-and the latter turns
out, surprisingly, to be a critic of the storytelling movement), and
by critics, such as Farber and Sherry. Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, Patricia Williams, and other well known contributors to
this literature are not represented. The papers on the judicial
opinion are concerned with the rhetoric of judicial opinions generally rather than with the narrative techniques used in them.
Indeed, the subtitle of the book-"Narrative and Rhetoric in the
Law" (my emphasis)-may reflect misgivings about whether
there is enough to say about the story element in law to sustain a
volume unless the canvas is enlarged to take in the entire rhetorical aspect of law. 0
Particularly conspicuous by its absence from the volume is
any sustained consideration of the methodological issue-by
what means is one to study the story element in law? Literary
theorists and philosophers who have written influential works on
narrative, such as Wayne Booth, Arthur Danto, and Martha
Nussbaum, are not represented; nor such doyens of the law and
literature movement as Richard Weisberg and James Boyd
White. (I do not fault the editors for these omissions; for all I
know they invited all the people I've named either to the conference itself or to submit a paper for the conference volume.) Although the professors of literature who contributed to the volume
refer at times to literary technique, they do not discuss the techniques special to narrative, such as the choice among types of
narrator (ranging from the obtuse to the omniscient), the con' Farber and Sherry's criticisms appear in Law's Stories in an oblique and truncated
form. For the full version, see Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out
of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,45 Stan L Rev 807 (1993). See also Richard A.
Posner, OvercomingLaw 368-84 (Harvard 1995), which makes similar criticisms of Patricia J. Williams's book The Alchemy ofRace and Rights (Harvard 1991).
" Thankfully, the book does not attempt to swallow the law and literature movement
whole by examining literary narratives of legal themes, such as Bleak House, Billy Budd,
and The Trial.
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struction of an implied author (who may be different from both
the real author and the narrator), the role of description and extraneous detail, the juxtaposing of parallel stories (for example,
Shakespeare's juxtaposition in King Lear of the story of Gloucester and his sons with the story of Lear and his daughters), and
the handling of time. Ever since the Iliad, narratives have often
begun and ended in medias res, so that the surface or foreground
story does not coincide chronologically with the implied or background story that generates it." These techniques are the subject
of narrative theory proper, but they are not discussed in Law's
Stories.
Not only is the book's coverage spotty, but the quality of the
papers is uneven. Many (not all) of the comments, though they
may have been effective when delivered orally at the symposium,
are too ephemeral to warrant publication in a book that the copyright page assures us "meets the guidelines for permanence and
durability" of a committee on "Book Longevity." Some of the papers and comments, as I have already suggested, do not belong in
a book on narratology (maybe "and Rhetoric" was added to the
subtitle in realistic recognition of the unwillingness or inability of
many of the participants to stick to the subject). John Hollander's
interesting essay on metaphor in law and in literature is an example. And although there is a long history of confessional literature, and of first-person narration in imaginative literature
(think only of the narrator of The Tell-Tale Heart), Brooks's essay
on confessions focuses on the non-narratological issues of voluntariness and of the merits of Miranda.
Remarkably, considering that the book is intended to showcase this new movement that I am calling legal narratology, the
overall tone of Law's Stories is skeptical and critical, even defensive. Criticisms and expressions of doubt outweigh praise and
claims of insight, and the criticisms are more convincing than the
praise. At the very outset of the book, Gewirtz's introduction
notes the problem of typicality (p 6). The significance of a story of
oppression depends on its representativeness. In a nation of more
than a quarter of a billion people all blanketed by the electronic
media, every ugly thing that can happen will happen and will
eventually become known; to evaluate policies for dealing with
the ugliness we must know its frequency, a question that is in
the domain of social science rather than of narrative.
" In Oedipus Tyrannus, for example, the implied story stretches from before the birth
of Oedipus to his exile from Thebes (and possibly beyond-to his death and the deaths of
his two sons and of his daughter Antigone), but the story depicted in the play itself begins
only hours before his exile and ends just before his actual departure.

1997]

Legal Narratology

Related to the problem of typicality, and to the problem that
Farber and Sherry have discussed under the rubric of analytical
content, is the problem of causality. Stories often implicitly claim
to identify causes. When a defendant in his plea of mercy tells a
horrific (and let us assume truthful) story of childhood abuse and
neglect, he implicitly asserts a causal relationship between the
events narrated and the criminal act for which he is to be sentenced; the story has no relevance otherwise. But to assert and to
prove are two different things. The proof is critical, and is not
supplied by the story, which may merely be appealing to credulous and sentimental intuitions.
Martha Minow notes that "[v]ictim stories risk trivializing
pain" and "adhere to an unspoken norm that prefers narratives
of helplessness to stories of responsibility, and tales of victimization to narratives of human agency and capacity" (p 32). Nevertheless she thinks that they have value in "disrupt[ing] these rationalizing, generalizing modes of analysis [legal doctrine, economic analysis, and philosophical theory] with a reminder of
human beings and their feelings, quirky developments, and textured vitality" (p 36). This sounds good, but it raises a question
about the oppositional movement in legal scholarship that the
book does not confront.' The question is the audience for this
scholarship and is related to the sensitive issue of the narrative
skills of the stories' authors. You need considerable literary skill
to write a story that will effectively challenge a reader's preconceptions. People read junk that does not challenge their preconceptions; they do not read junk that does challenge them. Of all
the legal storytellers, the only one who seems to me to have a
real literary gift is Patricia Williams. This is not said in criticism
of the others. A law professor should not be ashamed of lacking
literary genius. But if he does lack it, he cannot expect to obtain
a readership for his stories from among people whom those stories are intended to embarrass and shake up. It seems likely that
almost the entire audience for oppositional legal scholarship, besides a restive and largely unimpressionable captive audience of
law students, will consist of persons who are already part of the
opposition. I would be interested to learn what function they

It is discussed in Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can
JudgesAvoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 Tex L Rev 1929, 1933 (1991). Farber and Sherry
come close, in their contribution to the symposium, when they remark (p 245 n 43) that
the oppositionists' support of "hate speech7 codes, codes intended to suppress "malign stories," indicates a lack of confidence that the oppositionists' "good" stories will prevail in
the competition of stories.
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think they are serving by swapping stories of oppression with
each other.
Farber and Sherry remind us that if "'stories from the bottom' have the power to shift belief in progressive directions, stories from the top-pornography, hate speech, and symbolic government actions-can entrench racism, sexism, and other evils"
(p 39). Anthony Kronman makes the same point more bluntly"stories contribute no independent moral insight of their own"
(p 56)-and Catharine MacKinnon makes the point angrily:
Stories break stereotypes, but stereotypes are also stories,
and stories can be full of them .... [Tihere is much to be
said for data.... Lies are the ultimate risk of storytelling as
method. This may be embarrassingly non-postmodern, but
reality exists.... It is my view that the major conflicts of
our time are over the real and only secondarily over versions
of it and methods for apprehending it (pp 235-36)
(paragraph breaks omitted).
She is reacting to the frivolousness of postmodernism, which in
claiming that all reality is constructed-everything is a storytends to occlude the perception of real suffering by taking literally Hamlet's quip that "There is nothing either good or bad, but
thinking makes it so." 13
The risk of narratology to which MacKinnon herself succumbs in her writings on pornography is that of atypicality.
MacKinnon is a magnet for the unhappy stories of prostitutes,
rape victims, and pornographic models and actresses. Even if all
these stories are true (though how many are exaggerated? Does
MacKinnon know?), their frequency is an essential issue in deciding what if anything the law should try to do about the suffering that the stories narrate. So, despite her criticism of storytelling, she is herself a kind of paranarratologist, who makes her
case through other women's stories.
Another risk in legal storytelling, besides atypicality, inattention to causation, preaching to the converted, and lack of
analytical content, is emotionality. While Gewirtz, following the
new philosophical literature on emotion, emphasizes the cognitive value of emotion (p 145), it would be dangerous to deny the
risk that emotionality poses to law. (And Gewirtz does not deny
it.) Evidence is regularly excluded from jury trials on the ground
that it would unduly inflame the jury, and jury verdicts are
sometimes set aside because the verdict shows that the jury was
' William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act H, Scene H, 11249-50 (Methuen 1982).
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carried away by passion or prejudice. The legal narratologists
know all this and do not, as far as I know, question it. But they
have had difficulty specifying the appropriate role of emotion in
trials and other legal settings. The narratologists who think it
fine that a criminal defendant at his sentencing hearing should
use the story of his life to stir the judge's sense of pity are appalled when the prosecutor uses the story of the victim's life to
stir the judge's retributive sense.
I think that Gewirtz is right, and that in this setting what is
sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander. Bandes's response is that the passion for revenge is a bad emotion; she refers to it as the "crude passion for revenge" and "a thirst for undifferentiated vengeance."14 Nussbaum argues in a similar vein
that revenge is a primitive emotion because it abstracts from the
particulars of the individual wrongdoer.' She thinks it is therefore unsuitable for sentencing, where the focus should be on the
individual defendant. Revenge is primitive, in the sense of instinctual, as also is love, of which compassion for a criminal is a
dilute form; but I do not think that the primitiveness of an emotion should disqualify it from playing a role in sentencing. Had
Hitler been brought to trial in 1945 it would have been absurd to
allow him to tell the story of his deprived childhood and the disappointments of early adulthood and being gassed in World War
I and so forth while forbidding any statements by his victims
concerning their sufferings at his hands. To complain that the
admission of such statements would bespeak a "thirst for undifferentiated vengeance" would strike most of us as being in conspicuously poor taste. And likewise if the defendant were not a
Hitler but a lesser monster, such as a serial killer or a terrorist
bomber. The principal objection to revenge, that it lacks measure
or discrimination because the victim of the wrong is the selfappointed judge, has no force when the issue is merely the admissibility of victim impact statements before a disinterested
judge (or jury).
Robert Weisberg in his contribution to Law's Stories is caustic about poverty-law narratives, in which the author tries to reconstruct the client's true story from the version the lawyer or
judge told. Weisberg says that in such narratives the author often "is overly engaged in the rhetoric of ethical or political selfcongratulation, often lapsing into banality or sentimentality"
(p 75). He emphasizes "the utility of narrative in promoting sym-

" Bandes, 63 U Chi L Rev at 398 (cited in note 7).
Nussbaum, 22 Phil & Pub Aff at 89-90 (cited in note 7).
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bolic national or group identity over abstract ideological or governmental structure" (p 77), using as his principal example the
trial of John Brown (as analyzed by Robert Ferguson), which altered the terms of the slavery debate and paved the way for Lincoln's redefinition of national purpose. Brown "transformed himself from a man of questionable character, a feckless loser in both
business and the military, into a mythic hero by artfully blending
legal rhetoric, courtroom dramaturgics, and shards of junk culture from popular American romances" (p 79). Weisberg admires
these theatrics but recognizes that they were a misuse of the
trial process; they illustrate the trial turned into a circus; they
'suggest the danger of confusing trial with theater, law with literature. Gewirtz suggests that the growing intrusiveness of the
news media, and the public's growing insistence on participating
in the business of political and legal governance directly rather
than merely voting for the officials who shall govern, are a
growing threat to the efficacy and integrity of trial by jury
(pp 156-57). And in Weisberg's reference to the utility of narrative in promoting a symbolic national identity and transforming
a man of questionable character into a mythic hero we may sense
an allusion to the master narrativist of our century, Adolf Hitler,
who told his rapt audiences an emotion-charged story of the betrayal and humiliation of the nation.
My referring to Hitler in this connection is not hyperbolic.
Lawrence Douglas, in an article published too recently to be
mentioned in Law's Stories, points out that the arguments made
by the growing corps of Holocaust deniers
powerftully evoke the rhetoric of attorneys practiced in the
art of adversarial litigation.

By casting the trial as a truth-seeking device, the [deniers]
are thus able to present the most tendentious and partisan
hyperbole as a proper contribution to public debate and historical instruction. 6
As Douglas argues, and as the distortions of truth in John
Brown's trial illustrate, criminal justice "has long been dedicated
to values such as protecting the dignity and autonomy of the accused that may actually disable the pursuit of truth in a par-

6 Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment: The Law, the Holocaust,and Denial,
7 Hist & Memory 100, 109-10 (Fall 1996).
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ticular case."' That is, the trial suffers from the same epistemological inadequacies as narrative, which it employs and resembles. Supreme Court Justices who participate in the foolish trials
of Shakespeare's authorship 8 do not realize that they are legitimating a misuse of trial procedure that undermines standards of
historical accuracy.
Pierre Leval's essay begins: "I am a judge. I know nothing of
the theories of narrative and of literary criticism of law. I wondered why I was invited to contribute to this volume" (p 206)."9
Then of course he tells a story, and very well too. But the point of
the story, as of his essay as a whole, is that judges should forgo
the "quest after persuasive power or beauty" in favor of "clear
analysis and clear transmission" of their decisions (p 207). He
quotes another contributor to the symposium: "When a story is
well told, I park my analytic faculties" (p 208, quoting Harlon
Dalton on p 57). Leval is caustic about judges who, "see[ing]
themselves brushing up against immortality... spurn the vulgar
tongue and use sonorous forms that will resonate in history" (p
208). But beauty and sonority are not synonyms; nor is clarity incompatible with rhetorical power. When judicial opinions tell stories, as they have to do in cases in which the facts matter, they
might as well tell them well. Yet as Sanford Levinson in his paper for the symposium reminds us, judges have to know when not
to tell stories, and by doing so he supports Leval's reservations
about legal narratology (pp 198-99). Levinson argues convincingly that the Supreme Court in Brown v Board of Education
was right to omit a narrative of the history of the oppression of
black people in the South, even though that history is the essential background to understanding the harm of segregated
schooling; for such a narrative would have made it even more difficult than it proved to be for the southern states to accept the
decision. The Court's reliance in the Brown decision on social science in lieu of storytelling "° has been criticized sharply and often;
how ironic, but how telling, that its choice should be defended in
a book on legal narrative!

17 Id at 110.

Irvin Molotsky, You-Know-Who Wrote the Plays, Judges Say, NY Times 1 (Sept 26,
1987); Amy E. Schwartz, Three Justices, a Poetry-Starved Crowd and Shakespeare, Wash
Post A19 (Oct 14, 1987).
Judge Leval is a highly regarded federal court of appeals judge and former federal
district judge.
Brown v Boardof Education,347 US 483, 494 n 11 (1954).

